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Establishment of hospital accreditation programs is increasingly growing across numerous developing nations. 
Such initiatives aim to improve quality of care. However, such establishments, mainly incentivized by successful 
and famous accreditation plans in developed countries, usually suffer from lack of necessary arrangements 
which, in turn, result in undesired consequences. Indeed, the first priority for such nations, including Iran, is not 
establishment of accreditation programs, yet strict licensing plans.    
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Similarities Between Accreditation and Olympic Games
Hospital accreditation programs, with a history of more 
than six decades in developed nations,1 may have some 
similarities with the Olympic Games. Both aimed to improve 
the quality and outcomes, one in care and services and the 
other in physical abilities and records. Both work through 
establishment of some type of competition, the former among 
hospitals and the latter among athletes and nations. Indeed, the 
participants may first pass some basic requirements, the basic 
level of standards or the qualification records to be qualified 
for the competition. In both events, the participants are 
usually among the fittest ones, well-organized hospitals and 
the nationally selected athletes, respectively. Therefore, the 
expected quality of participants in the events is much higher 
than what is expected from the average of typical hospitals or 
athletes. In both, the winners are rewarded, by a gold seal, or 
gold medal, which brings them other achievements such as 
reputation and possibly financial benefits. Both events need 
funding, which usually come from application fees paid by 
applicant hospitals or the membership fees, paid by member 
nations. Finally, both events take place every three-four 
years. Such similarities are seen between most accreditation 
programs of developed nations and the Olympic Games. 
However, the story is rather different in some developing 
countries.2-5
Different Story in Iran and Some Developing Countries
Developing countries historically suffer from a lack of 
effective control over hospital establishment considerations6,7 
and Iran is no exception. Such considerations may include 
need assessment, site selection, mapping, construction and 
material, wards and spaces, staffing, and equipping. Finally 
after the establishment, hospitals should be monitored for 
their clinical processes and outcomes. 
Experiencing patient dissatisfaction and undesirable status 
of hospitals, especially after the years of 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq 
war,8 Iran’s government decided to establish a program to 
solve the problems. What established was a national hospital 
grading or accreditation program in 1998.9 Indeed, the 
accreditation program implemented was mainly influenced 
by the reputation and impressive impacts of accreditation 
programs in developed nations such as the United States. 
However, Government’s expectations from the accreditation 
program to overhaul all hospitals led to some unusual and 
odd legislations and mechanisms within the accreditation 
program, even in its new version, launched in 2012.
The first different policy from what happens in the United 
States, is Iran’s compulsory accreditation program. Iran’s 
Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME), as 
both the accreditation body and agent, obliged all hospitals,10 
not voluntarily as happens in most accreditation programs,11 
to prepare themselves for the accreditation. Therefore, 
there would be no minimum entrance requirement for 
accreditation. Such obligation from the government side for 
national accreditation was probably in order to make sure 
that hospitals would not miss basic requirements, as there 
was no other effective means that check and control the basics 
across hospitals. Such basic requirements could be related to 
space and building such as a separate entrance for emergency 
department (ED), minimum of 9 m2 space per bed in any 
inpatient room, etc12 or human resources that hospitals have 
no or less control over them.13 Against this kind of standards, 
hospitals may resist or game because they could not make 
necessary changes easily.13,14 Moreover, we know that the 
effectiveness of Iranian hospital accreditation comes from 
its pay for performance (P4P) policy, according to which the 
audit scores would define hospitals’ level of charges.15 Such 
P4P policy conflicts with the MoHME’s interests; MoHME 
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises an  g eater openness when it comes to dv cacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global ealth and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
ormative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as th  primary level and the normative as
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘th  political’ I mean the dimension of
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human ocieties, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices a d institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS eatment” to illustrate his point.1 He fr mes the 
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clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity t ee  c lars a  et ee sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a v cacy.1
e c e  t e eff rt t  rei state er a  litics i  
gl al healt  a  agree t at “a rely e irical evi e ce- ase  
a r ac  is a ficti ,” a  t at s c  a vie  risks c veri g  
“t e r le f litics a  er.” t y c trasti g t is ficti  
it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive  y crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cer s f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s itti g t  a li eral 
c ce ti  f litics e i licitly criticizes t e tc es 
f.1  li eral vie  f litics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts a  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec ic 
calc lati , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
is ec e  i  s e  e states t at “it is t ssi le t  
isc ss t e litics f gl al ealt  it t isc si g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at e ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
a  er res se is t  evel  a  t l gical c ce ti  f 
t e litical, ere “t e litical el gs t  r t l gical
c iti .”3 cc r i g t  ffe, s ciety is i stit te
t r g  c flict. “[ ]y ‘t e litical’ I ea  t e i e si  f 
a tag is  ic  I take t  e c stit tive f a  s cieties, 
ile y ‘ litics’ I ea  t e set f ractices an  i stit ti s
t r g  ic  a  r er is create , rga izi g a  
c existe ce i  t e c text f c flict ality r vi e  y t e 
litical.”3  iss e r a t ic ee s t  e c teste  t  ec e 
litical, a  s c  a c testati  c cer s lic acti  a  
creates a ‘ e’ a  ‘t ey’ f r  f c llective i e tificati . t 
t e fixati  f s cial relati s is artial a  recari s, si ce 
a tag is  is a  ever rese t ssi ility.  liticize a  iss e 
a  e a le t  ilize s rt, e ee s t  re rese t t e 
rl  i  a c flict al a er “ it  se  ca s it  
ic  e le ca  i e tify.”3 
s ses t e ase f “i creasi g i ter ati al ai  s e i g
 I S eat e t” t  ill strate is i t.1 e fr es t e 
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owns most of Iran’s hospitals and strict audits would decrease 
hospitals’ revenue that would be a huge financial burden 
on the government. Consequently, the MoHME’s role as 
both accreditation agent and owner of hospitals results in 
easygoing policies through auditing public hospitals.16 The 
consequences would be even worse regarding that various 
basic standards of hospital had been neglected when they 
were licensed.17 Therefore, the government’s compulsory 
auditing policy would not work due to basic shortcomings in 
hospitals and conflict of interest for the government.
The second difference between Iran’s hospital accreditation 
program and the USA’s was its level of standards. Contrary 
to most accreditation programs,18 the Iranian accreditation 
standards were not and could be optimum or even at a high 
level.15 Therefore, what is audited through the accreditation 
would be a long list of standards including a mix of basic ones 
and probably some advanced. Indeed, the audited standards 
would be diluted in favor of low and basic ones and should be 
run every year because there is no other effective controlling 
device over hospitals’ standards. The long list of requirements, 
which includes 37 domains with more than 1000 measures,12 
forces hospitals staff to carry out heaps of paperwork annually, 
not once in three-four years, and leads to their frustration.14 
Another mismatch in our comparison between the USA’s 
hospital accreditation program and Iran’s relates to the 
funding considerations. Owing to that hospital accreditation 
is a mandatory program in Iran, the governments cannot 
charge hospitals for application, which otherwise would seem 
irrational. Therefore, all expenses of running the accreditation 
are covered by the public budget. The volume of expenses is 
highly enormous considering that all hospitals, about 900, 
should be audited at least once a year. Hence the sustainability 
of such programs will be questionable.19 Therefore, owing to 
the high costs of running the accreditation program and its 
time consuming process, the MoHME would have less or no 
budget and time for development and revision plans over the 
program. As a result, the audited standards are usually out of 
date or invalid.14 
Strategic Faults
Considering the above mentioned situations, one may suggest 
that some developing nations, have made a strategic fault in the 
establishment of hospital accreditation plans. In Pakistan, for 
example, the accreditation standards could not fit all hospitals 
because some were poor even in basic requirements.20 In 
Lebanon, also some shortcomings like staffing and lack of 
quality improvement culture in some hospitals were reported 
as challenges of establishment of accreditation programs 
which should be solved before the establishment.21 In Iran 
as well, the accreditation programs can work well as quality 
improvement driver if basic standards and requirements are 
passed in hospitals beforehand. Otherwise, the accreditation 
program should include lots of basic domains and indicators 
which will be frustrating.15,22 The basic standards and 
requirements, such as building and structure measures, can 
be checked by authorities once at first. In the United States, 
the Department of Health and Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) have rigid regulations for licensing 
hospitals at their establishment point and monitor the basic 
regulations and standards annually.23 Therefore, hospitals 
start working only when they are truly licensed. Among the 
licensed hospitals, those seeking reputation and larger share 
of the market, should work on the advanced quality measures 
defined by a third party non-governmental agency such as the 
Joint Commission (TJC). Indeed what saves developed nations’ 
hospitals from basic shortcomings are not accreditation 
programs, but the initial licenses granted to hospitals by the 
governments through the Ministry/Department of Health or 
other public authorities. The accreditation programs across 
them usually ensure continuous improvement of quality.
In the current situation, what probably will work for 
developing nations such as Iran, for improvement of hospitals, 
can be a model demonstrated in the Figure. First the nations 
need a strong institute that its technical job is licensing. Such 
institution should not let the hospitals become established 
with very severe shortcomings, nonstandard setting and 
spaces for instance, that are impossible or really difficult to 
change later. Many hospitals in Iran are located in busy and 
heavy-traffic avenues that make accessing them very difficult 
even in emergencies. Some hospital also are licensed when 
they have no sufficient space for their beds. Nevertheless, 
these hospitals are accredited, while cannot solve their basic 
problems.
The next step after establishment of a rigid licensing 
mechanism, can be establishment of certification mechanisms. 
The certification mechanisms would be voluntary audits 
which focus on one or a few aspects of volunteer hospitals’ 
performance. Examples of such certificates may include 
“patient safety friendly” or “baby friendly” certificates for 
hospitals apply and follow the necessary standards. The 
certificate can improve hospitals’ reputation and fame so 
increase their share of the market among their rivals. This 
kind of initiatives can make healthcare organizations and their 
culture mature enough for the establishment of accreditation 
and continuous quality improvement programs.24 Hence, a 
gradual process for establishment of accreditation programs 
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Conclusion
Accreditation systems in the majority of developing countries, 
although might have positive impacts on quality of care,25,26 
are possibly established without considering all necessary 
arrangements. Strict rules for licensing the newly established 
hospitals and useful benchmarks for certification plans are 
among neglected necessary arrangements. Such accreditation 
programs, not only have no revenue for the accreditation 
agents, eg, the government in Iran, still impose a great 
burden of cost on developing countries.27 The dysfunctional 
consequences may even question the trade-off between 
the benefits and harms of the accreditation programs.14 
Indeed policy-makers in developing nations should regard 
establishment of accreditation systems carefully and as 
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